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FIXING NOTICE FAILURE: HOW TO TAME THE TROLLS 
AND RESTORE BALANCE TO THE PATENT SYSTEM 
ABSTRACT 
Patent litigation has become more frequent, more uncertain, and more 
expensive. Much of this can be traced to the rise of patent trolls asserting 
vague and uncertain software patents. Trolls have been derided as bring-
ing frivolous and vexatious suits against productive companies, sapping 
the very same innovativeness that the patent system is supposed to en-
courage. Instead, companies are subject to nuisance-value suits as an 
ordinary course of business; for less established companies, such suits can 
threaten their very existence. Often, because of uncertain rules about 
claim construction and the granting of very broad patents, the accused 
infringer has no notice of any potential infringing behavior until the suit is 
brought or a demand letter is sent. This lack of notice—or “notice failure” 
as it is called—is a serious problem that disturbs the careful balance the 
patent system tries to achieve. In exchange for a limited monopoly in the 
invention, the patentee must disclose to the public what was invented. But 
if the public is not given proper notice of the full scope of the invention, 
the quid pro quo is turned on its head, favoring the patentee at the expense 
of the public. This Note proposes strengthening the notice requirement of 
the patent system. In particular, damages should be limited to behavior 
occurring after actual notice is given to an accused infringer where a 
patent troll asserts a software patent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent reform is being clamored for from various quarters—from In-
dustry,1 from the Academy,2 from members of the Judiciary,3 from the 
Press,4 from public interest groups,5 and even from some less traditional 
sources.6 The passage of the America Invents Act (AIA),7 although helpful to 
some degree,8 largely ignored the most pressing problems of the patent sys-
tem.9 Among these pressing problems are: overcompensating infringement 
                                                                                                                         
1 See, e.g., About the Coalition, COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, http://www.patent 
fairness.org/learn/about (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
2 See generally, DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW 
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009). As further evidence of continuing academic interest 
in the subject, see the recent conference on software patents at Santa Clara Law. See 
Conference Report, High Tech Law Inst., Solutions to the Software Patent Problem (Nov. 
16, 2012), http://law.scu.edu/hightech/2012-solutions-to-the-software-patent-problem/.  
3 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict Competition 
and Creativity Excessively?, BECKER–POSNER BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://w 
ww.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrict-competition-a 
nd-creativity-excessively-posner.html [hereinafter Posner, Competition and Creativity] 
(“My general sense ... is that patent protection is on the whole excessive and that major 
reforms are necessary.”); Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in 
America, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/arc 
hive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725 [hereinafter Posner, Too 
Many Patents]. But see Richard A. Epstein, Apple v. Motorola: Are There Really Too 
Many Patents in America?, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 6, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.news 
week.com/apple-v-motorola-are-there-really-too-many-patents-america-64489. 
4 See, e.g., Christopher Danzig, A Closer Look at the ‘Chaos’ of the American Patent 
System, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 9, 2012, 3:12 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/10/a-clo 
ser-look-at-the-chaos-of-the-american-patent-system (describing problems of the patent 
system and popular press accounts of the same); Steven Levy, The Patent Problem, 
WIRED (Nov. 13, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/ff-steven-lev 
y-the-patent-problem/all/; Brad Plumer, Everything You Need to Know About Patent 
Reform in One Post, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.c 
om/blogs/ezra-klein/post/everything-you-need-to-know-about-patent-reform-in-one-post/20 
11/09/06/gIQAOD4V7J_blog.html. 
5 See Patents, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/patent (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2014). 
6 See David Holmes, The Patent Song, PANDODAILY (Oct. 1, 2012), http://pandodail 
y.com/2012/10/01/pandohouse-rock-the-patent-song (singing about patent reform with such 
lyrics as “we all hate trolls right?” and “reform is the only way”). 
7 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
8 See Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting 
Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 688–90 (2012) (arguing that the joinder provision 
of the AIA may decrease a patent troll’s litigious activity). 
9 See, e.g., BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
“PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE (2013) (“However, the AIA contains relatively few provisions 
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verdicts;10 a vague and difficult-to-apply standard for determining “reason-
able royalties”;11 uncertain patent scope;12 the high cost of defending even 
spurious patent claims;13 and the flurry of “troll” suits that all this invariably 
encourages.14 Despite widespread attention being brought to these issues,15 
                                                                                                                         
that arguably might impact [NPEs] ....”); Rob Wheeler & James Allworth, U.S. Patent 
Overhaul Won’t Help Innovators, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 9:38 AM), 
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/09/the_america_invents_act_rearra.html (concluding that the 
AIA does little to nothing about patent law’s biggest problems, including fuzziness of 
patent scope). 
10 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 8 (2009) (describing testimony that “damage awards 
... are too often excessive and untethered from the harm that compensatory damages are 
intended to measure” (citations omitted)); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent 
Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630–31 (2008) (arguing that 
royalty calculations are often disproportionate to the contribution of the infringed patent); 
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 2044 (2007) (arguing that patentees recover “more than their fair share” owing to 
damage calculations). But see David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the 
Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 130 (2009) (describing a statistical analysis of 
patent verdicts that fails to support a trend of large verdicts); Michael J. Mazzeo et al., 
Patent Damages and the Need for Reform, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 3, 2011, 5:19 AM), http:// 
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/03/patent-damages.html (describing an empirical study 
suggesting that infringement damage awards are not excessive, except for some outliers). 
11 See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1688 (2010) 
(“‘Determining a fair and a reasonable royalty ... seem[s] often to involve more the 
talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.’” (quoting ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 
594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010))); Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Note, Protecting the Gates of 
Reasonable Royalty: A Damages Framework for Patent Infringement Cases, 11 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192, 198–205 (2011) (blaming the Georgia-Pacific 
factors for being confusing and hard to apply). 
12 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking 
Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009) (“Patent law has provided 
none of the certainty associated with the definition of boundaries in real property law.”). 
13 See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from 
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (describing 
median litigation costs under various circumstances). 
14 See, e.g., YEH, supra note 9, at 8–13. But see John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and 
Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007) (arguing for a more nuanced approach 
and that NPEs should not be categorically denied injunctions). 
15 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4 (2008); Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007); Abusive Patent Litigation: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, 
FACT SHEET: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), http:// 
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there are disagreements about what, if anything, ought to be done.16 In 
particular, the software and pharmaceutical industries are often seen as 
occupying opposing camps, a result of the underlying differences between 
those two groups.17 
Some worry that large patent-infringement verdicts are becoming a 
trend.18 Just recently, Apple won more than $1 billion in a verdict from 
Samsung, largely from patent infringement claims.19 But even where a case 
results in a finding of non-infringement or invalidity, it may be a pyrrhic 
victory for many companies that are unable to shoulder large legal ex-
penses.20 Given the high stakes, the uncertainty involved, and the costs of 
even successfully defending a patent-infringement action, there are strong 
incentives for companies—small, medium, or large—to settle.21 Enter 
patent trolls—known among polite company as Non-Practicing Entities 
(NPEs).22 Attempting to exploit this situation to their advantage and 
effectively immune from infringement counterclaims, NPEs target a 
wide array of companies, expecting many to settle quickly.23 The economic 
costs from this practice are enormous, estimated by some at $29 billion for 
                                                                                                                         
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-hi 
gh-tech-patent-issues; see also supra notes 1–6. 
16 See, e.g., YEH, supra note 9, at 1 (stating that Congress put few provisions in the 
AIA to address NPEs because of “lively debate over what, if anything, should be done 
about them”). 
17 See, e.g., Megan L. Wiggins, Note, Patent Reform and Damages Apportionment: 
Addressing the Concerns of Industry-Scale Users of the U.S. Patent System Without 
Legislatively Mandating a “Specific Contribution over the Prior Art,” 40 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 273, 283–291 (2010); Posner, Competition and Creativity, supra note 3; Posner, 
Too Many Patents, supra note 3. 
18 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
19 See Joel Rosenblatt, Apple’s $1 Billion Verdict May Lead to Samsung Sales Ban, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2012, 2:03 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-25/a 
pple-s-1-billion-verdict-may-lead-to-samsung-sales-ban.html. 
20 See KEITH E. MASKUS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REFORMING U.S. 
PATENT POLICY: GETTING THE INCENTIVES RIGHT 15–17 (2006); supra note 13. 
21 See, e.g., YEH, supra note 9, at 1 (“The vast majority [of infringement cases] end in 
settlements because litigation is risky, costly, and disruptive for defendants ....”); William 
M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some Preliminary 
Results, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 750–54 (2004) (finding that most patent cases end in 
settlement, more so than for civil litigation generally). 
22 See, e.g., Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 
(2012); Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 51; Bryant, supra note 
8, at 688. 
23 Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against 
Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160–61 (2006). 
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2011, or over $1.5 trillion over the period from 1990 to 2010.24 While 
NPEs have their defenders, the value they add to the patent system or the 
economy more broadly is far from clear.25 Indeed, some observers have 
concluded from all this that patents have an overall deleterious effect on 
innovation, contrary to their intended and constitutional purpose.26 Some 
members of Congress have proposed legislation directly targeting the 
pernicious effects of NPEs on the patent system.27 Even the FTC—
following the lead of the President—is planning an inquiry into frivolous 
patent lawsuits and the behavior of patent trolls.28 
Concerns with the state of patent law are especially pressing for tech-
nology companies.29 Software patents, in particular, have been the subject 
of intense dispute.30 Technology companies are now acquiring large patent 
                                                                                                                         
24 See James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2091210 
(estimating $29 billion of direct costs in 2011); James E. Bessen et al., The Private and 
Social Costs of Patent Trolls (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 
12-34, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930272 (finding over half a trillion 
dollars of loss to defendants from 1990–2010, resulting in “reduced innovation incentives”). 
25 See Risch, supra note 22, at 497–99; see also supra note 24. 
26 See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-035A 2012), http://research.stlouisf 
ed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf. 
27 See H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2012) (requiring NPEs to pay attorneys’ fees if they 
lose, but applying only to software patents); H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013) (same, but 
applying generally to all utility patents); see also Lisa Shuchman, Revamped SHIELD Act 
Again Seeks to Thwart ‘Patent Trolls,’ CORP. COUNS. (Feb. 28, 2013, 5:06 PM), http://w 
ww.corpcounsel.com/id=1202590122842. 
28 See Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Is Said to Plan Inquiry of Frivolous Patent Lawsuits, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/business/ftc-is-said-to-plan-in 
quiry-of-frivolous-patent-lawsuits.html. 
29 See, e.g., YEH, supra note 9, at 15; Posner, Competition and Creativity, supra note 3. 
30 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Computer and the Patent System: The Problem of the 
Second Step, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 47, 48-49, 51-52 (2002); Andrew 
Nieh, Note, Software Wars: The Patent Menace, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 295, 299 
(2010); Dennis Crouch, Making Software Patents Transparent and Understandable: 
Begin by Determining Whether Software Is Patentable, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 9, 2012, 11:35 
PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/making-software-patents-transparent-and-u 
nderstandable-begin-by-determining-whether-software-is-patentable.html; Mark Rawls, On 
Software Patents and Patent Trolls, WM. & MARY STUDENT INTELL. PROP. SOC’Y BLOG 
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://sips.blogs.wm.edu/2011/12/08/on-software-patents-and-patent-troll 
s/; Michael Risch, Curing the Problem of Software Patents, GROKLAW (June 10, 2012, 6:44 
PM), http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=20120610180253648. The issue is 
especially timely, given the Supreme Court’s recent § 101 subject-matter cases and the 
Federal Circuit’s en banc rehearing of CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). See Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit to Announce Whether Software Is 
Patentable?, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 9, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/20 
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portfolios, mostly as a defensive position.31 These patent portfolios can 
then be used either for cross-licensing or as an implicit threat of an in-
fringement counterclaim if sued.32 The so-called “patent thicket”33—the 
reality that sophisticated technological products are covered by thousands 
or hundreds of thousands of patents—encourages this strategy of mutually 
assured destruction. Whatever the value of this practice, it offers no de-
fense against NPEs who do not produce anything to be countersued over.34 
Particularly troublesome where software patents  are concerned is what is 
called “notice failure,” where broadly written claims and lax enforcement 
of definiteness requirements mean that companies often do not know they 
                                                                                                                         
12/10/federal-circuit-to-announce-whether-software-is-patentable-en-banc-rehearing-on-s 
ection-101-issues.html. 
31 See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 20, at 18; Rawls, supra note 30. But such portfolios 
are not invariably defensive. Consider this story, for instance: 
An awkward silence ensued. The blue suits did not even confer 
among themselves. They just sat there, stonelike. Finally, the chief suit 
responded. “OK,” he said, “maybe you don’t infringe these seven pa-
tents. But we have 10,000 U.S. patents. Do you really want us to go 
back to Armonk [IBM headquarters in New York] and find seven pa-
tents you do infringe? Or do you want to make this easy and just pay us 
$20 million?” 
After a modest bit of negotiation, Sun cut IBM a check, and the 
blue suits went to the next company on their hit list. 
Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES (June 24, 2002), http://www.forbes.com/asa 
p/2002/0624/044.html. 
32 See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 20, at 18; Rob Goodier, Patent Trolls: How Bad Is 
the Problem?, POPULAR MECHS. (Oct. 25, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.popularmechanic 
s.com/technology/gadgets/news/patent-trolls-how-bad-is-the-problem (“Large stockpiles 
of patents can lead to a legal détente between tech giants simply because both companies 
own enough patents to sue the other repeatedly.”); Rawls, supra note 30. Curiously, 
given the purpose of the patent system, such patent portfolios are not, as a rule, used for 
innovation. See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 26, at 7 (“To learn more about the actual 
effect of patents in the real world, let us consider the response of Google to being pursued 
legally by a large competitor. One response is their recent purchase of Motorola 
Mobility.... Why the interest of Google? It is buying Motorola Mobility for its patent 
portfolio. Not for the ideas and innovations in that portfolio—few if any changes or 
improvements to Google’s Android operating system will result from the ownership or 
study of these software patents. The purpose of obtaining this patent portfolio is purely 
defensive: it can be used to countersue Apple and Microsoft and blunt their legal attack 
on Google.” (emphasis added)). 
33 See, e.g., YEH, supra note 9, at 10–11. 
34 See, e.g., Ahmed J. Davis & Karolina Jesien, The Balance of Power in Patent Law: 
Moving Towards Effectiveness in Addressing Patent Troll Concerns, 22 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 835, 837 (2012) (“Because trolls are non-producing 
entities, they are immune from infringement countersuits and the coincident bargaining 
for cross licensing agreements.”); Goodier, supra note 32. 
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may be infringing a patent until an infringement action is brought.35 Tech-
nology companies have not been shy about raising these concerns.36 In-
deed, many of the members of the Coalition for Patent Fairness—such as 
Google, Dell, Oracle, CISCO—are technology companies.37 Neither has 
the problem gone unnoticed at the Patent Office.38 
One way to counter the problems of notice failure and curb the more 
troubling aspects of NPEs is to strengthen notice requirements. Notice 
requirements, although weak, especially with regard to NPEs, are not 
unknown in the patent law.39 Generally, a company that manufactures a 
patented product must mark the product with its patent number.40 That 
mark constitutes constructive notice to potential infringers. If a company 
fails to mark a product, damages do not begin to accrue until actual notice 
is given by the patentee to an infringer.41 The marking requirement is only 
applicable when there is a product to mark, however, and so NPEs gener-
ally are not subject to any such marking requirement because they do not 
(by definition) practice their patents. Therefore, the only notice that poten-
tial infringers have in NPE suits is the patent as filed with the USPTO. 
This notice, especially for software patents, is often inadequate. 
This Note will argue that for software patents being asserted by NPEs, 
actual notice ought to be given to alleged infringers before damages begin to 
accrue.42 Part I of this Note will discuss how this requirement best enforces 
                                                                                                                         
35 See, e.g., YEH, supra note 9, at 9 (describing notice failure and the underlying 
causes of notice failure as both “fuzzy boundaries” of claims and the infeasibility of 
searching through existing patents in this field); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 46–72. 
36 See, e.g., Crossing the Finish Line on Patent Reform: What Can and Should be 
Done: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011); Brendon Chase, IBM Calls for 
Patent Reform, TECHREPUBLIC (April 11, 2005, 3:29 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com 
/article/ibm-calls-for-patent-reform/6310415; Evan Ramstad, Google Legal Chief: Patent 
Reform a Balancing Act, WALL ST. J. DIGITS BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 6:21 AM), http://blog 
s.wsj.com/digits/2012/10/09/google-legal-chief-patent-reform-a-balancing-act. 
37 See About the Coalition, COALITION FOR PAT. FAIRNESS, http://www.patentfairnes 
s.org/learn/about (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
38 See David Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. & Director of 
the USPTO, Keynote Address at the Center for American Progress: An Examination of 
Software Patents (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2012/kappos_C 
AP.jsp (“[W]e know that inconsistency in software patent issuance causes uncertainty in 
the marketplace and can cause threats of litigation that in turn can stifle innovation and 
deter new market entrants.”). 
39 See infra Part III. 
40 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 287(a) (West 2014); see also infra Part III. 
41 See § 287(a); see also infra Part III. 
42 This Note focuses only on software patents asserted by NPEs; the case for requiring 
notice here is particularly acute. Where a product is marked, but a software patent is later 
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the public purposes of the patent system. Part II will discuss the rationale of 
the marking requirement, and why it is logical to extend this notice require-
ment to NPEs and software patents. Part III will consider what a notice re-
quirement might look like in practice. 
I. SOFTWARE PATENTS AND THE PURPOSES OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
This Note will argue that software patents are different from other 
types of patents; that patents affect the software industry differently than 
other industries; that because of this, an individualized approach toward 
software patents is proper; and, that this individualized approach, guided 
by the public purposes of the patent system, should strengthen notice re-
quirements, particularly being directed at NPEs. 
A. Software Patents Are Different from Other Patents 
Software patents are different, fundamentally, from other types of pa-
tents, and in particular, from those in the pharmaceutical or biotechnology 
fields.43 Compared to other fields, software development is cheap.44 Soft-
ware patents tend to be more abstract, and, consequently, the metes and 
bounds of a patent claim in software is much fuzzier than in other fields.45 
Additionally, the software industry relies less on patent protection than 
other industries, especially the pharmaceutical or biotechnology industries.46 
Software patents are also different, empirically, from other patents, in that 
they tend to have higher rates of litigation and higher rates of claim con-
struction problems.47 
                                                                                                                         
asserted against an unrelated product, it may be doubtful that the marking actually 
provided much notice. Additionally, where a company that manufactures something 
asserts only method claims—and therefore is not subject to the marking requirement, see 
infra Part III—it is also doubtful that the accused infringer has much notice. This Note 
does not consider whether the proposal should be extended to these cases. 
43 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 188–93 (finding empirical evidence that 
software patents are different from other patents and arguing this is due to the 
abstractness of software); supra note 17. 
44 See, e.g., Posner, Competition and Creativity, supra note 3 (contrasting the high 
costs of the pharmaceutical industry with the relatively modest costs of software 
development); Wiggins, supra note 17, at 284–85; Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent 
System, FED. LAW., Feb. 2008, at 44, 45 (“The cost of much innovation in software today 
is relatively low when compared with the cost required by other industries ....”). 
45 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 187 (“Such patents often have unclear 
boundaries and give rise to opportunistic litigation.”). 
46 See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 20, at 20–21; Nieh, supra note 30, at 309–15; 
Posner, Competition and Creativity, supra note 3. 
47 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 152–53, 187 (“[Software] patents had high 
rates of litigation and high rates of claim-construction review on appeal.”). 
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1. Software Development Is Cheap Compared to Other Fields of 
Innovation 
It is much cheaper to develop new software than it is to develop a new 
drug or other product.48 In pharmaceutical development, huge outlays are 
spent on research and development, drug testing, and regulation compli-
ance.49 Moreover, the vast majority of drugs turn out to be ineffective or 
otherwise do not make it to market, increasing the real costs of develop-
ment.50 It takes on average ten to fifteen years to develop a new drug.51 
And, once developed, these drugs typically are useful at least throughout 
the life of the patent. Indeed, generic drugs, typically entering the market 
after patent expiration, account for a large portion of the total amount of 
filled prescriptions.52 In addition, this research and development is being 
spent on relatively few drugs, for which relatively few patents are issued.53 
In software development, in contrast to pharmaceutical and most other 
development, innovation tends to happen quickly and incrementally.54 
Instead of expensive capital investments, often the primary cost in soft-
ware development is the labor of the software developer.55 In addition to 
innovation being quick and incremental—and perhaps because of it—once 
developed, software has a relatively short life span, being quickly supersed-
ed by other technology. And the large sums that big technology companies 
                                                                                                                         
48 See Posner, supra note 3. 
49 Pharmaceutical Patents: The Value of Pharmaceutical Patents & Strong 
Intellectual Property Protection, INNOVATION.ORG, http://www.innovation.org/document 
s/File/Pharmaceutical_Patents.pdf. 
50 Id. at 6 (stating that only 1 in 5,000–10,000 compounds tested reach consumers and 
that only 3 in 10 drugs generate enough money to match or exceed the research and 
development costs for the drug). 
51 Id. at 4. 
52 See, e.g., Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, FTC (July 2002), http:// 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expirat 
ion-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (identifying the large market share that generic 
drugs have). 
53 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1590 (2003) (“In some industries, such as chemistry and pharmaceuticals, a single 
patent normally covers a single product.”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many 
Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents and University 
Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 300 (2010) (finding on average 
3.5 patents per small-molecule drug). 
54 Wiggins, supra note 17, at 283. 
55 See, Software Development Cost Estimating Guidebook, SOFTWARE TECH. 
SUPPORT CTR. 4–6 (Oct. 2010), http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/consulting/sw_estimation/soft 
wareguidebook2010.pdf (describing major cost factors of software development, which 
are mostly related to expected developer time). 
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spend on research and development,56 to the extent that such research co-
vers patentable subject matter, results in a large number of patents.57 By 
way of comparison to the pharmaceutical industry, which also spends large 
sums on research and development, in 2012 Glaxo Group Limited, the sub-
sidiary through which GlaxoSmithKline produces pharmaceuticals,58 re-
ceived sixty-eight patents to IBM’s 6457—and many of the top patent re-
cipients in terms of total patents issued by year are technology companies.59 
The reality that complex technical products are covered by a large number 
of patentable subcomponents—the so-called “patent thicket”60—also helps 
to explain why software development produces many patentable compo-
nents. Indeed, some estimate that a smartphone is covered by hundreds of 
thousands of patents.61 In contrast, a given drug developed by a pharmaceu-
tical company is covered only by a few patents.62 
These differences are not superficial. Because software development 
does not require the huge outlays that pharmaceutical research does, de-
velopment can happen more quickly and by a more diverse set of actors. 
That innovation in software is incremental means there is less risk that 
huge sums of capital and time will be spent on research paths that lead 
nowhere, which is a real and constant risk for pharmaceutical development 
where most drug ideas do not reach an end consumer and most drugs even 
at the later stages of development are not successful.63 That software de-
velopment may produce many patentable components and subcomponents, 
                                                                                                                         
56 See Posner: Who Needs Patents, Anyway?, IPNAV BLOG (July 19, 2012), http://ww 
w.ipnav.com/blog/posner-who-needs-patents-anyway/ (claiming that “[o]f the top 10 US 
companies ranked by R&D investment, only four are involved in pharmaceuticals,” and 
“the number one company is Microsoft,” with Cisco, Oracle, and Google also on the top-
ten list). 
57 For instance, compare supra note 53 with estimates that a smartphone contains over 
250,000 patentable components. See Mike Masnick, There Are 250,000 Active Patents 
that Impact Smartphones, TECHDIRT (Oct. 18, 2012, 8:28 AM), http://www.techdirt.com 
/blog/innovation/articles/20121017/10480520734/there-are-250000-active-patents-that-i 
mpact-smartphones-representing-one-six-active-patents-today.shtml. 
58 Company Overview of Glaxo Group Limited, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://in 
vesting.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=6450664 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
59 See PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS (UTILITY PATENTS) 2012 B1-1, B1-20 (2012), http://ww 
w.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_12.pdf (ranking organizations with forty or 
more patents granted in 2012 by number of patents granted).  
60 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
61 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
62 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
63 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
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for any given product, means that on average a given patent costs less than 
for pharmaceutical research, where expensive drug research will lead to 
only a few patents.64 That software innovation is quickly superseding 
older products further heightens this disparity between the cost of an indi-
vidual software patent and an individual pharmaceutical patent, especially 
because pharmaceutical research takes so long—ten to fifteen years on 
average.65 Moreover, there are a fair amount of software development 
activities—fixing bugs, improving user interfaces, expanding system 
compatibility, documentation—that are not likely to lead to new patents. 
In contrast, most pharmaceutical research has, as a long-term aim, the 
development of a new and patentable drug. This makes a simple compari-
son of the research and development costs of large technology companies 
and drug companies misleading.66 The net effect of all this is that it is 
much cheaper to come up with a patentable software claim than a patent-
able pharmaceutical claim. The worth of software patents is quite differ-
ent from other types of patents, especially pharmaceutical patents. 
2. Software Patents Are More Indeterminate than Other Patents 
Software patents have boundaries that are fuzzier than other patents; 
that is, notice failure is more pronounced for software patents than it is for 
other types of patents.67 This is in part because software claims tend to be 
more abstract than other types of claims.68 There are empirically more claim 
construction problems with software patents, which would be expected if 
                                                                                                                         
64 See supra notes 53, 57–62 and accompanying text. 
65 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
66 Such as can be seen in supra note 56; see also Boldrin & Levine, supra note 26, at 
4–6. It is also worth noting that software patents are not exclusive to technology 
companies. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 190 (2008) (“The 
general concern is over software patents, not the software industry per se. This distinction 
is important because almost all software patents are obtained by firms outside the 
software industry.”). 
67 See supra note 45; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66, at 150–51 (giving reasons why 
patent notice failure became worse during the 1990s, including decisions regarding claim 
construction, the use of continuing patent applications, changes in software patents allowing 
for more abstract claims, and the increase in number of patents); id. at 189, 192 (describing 
the history of and continued opposition to software patents by technology companies); id. at 
194 (“We believe that, on average, software patents suffer notice problems more acutely 
than patents drawn from most other areas of technology.”). See generally id. at 46–72 
(discussing notice failure generally, and the importance of clear boundaries). 
68 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66, at 187 (“We argue that there is, in fact, 
something crucially different about software: software is an abstract technology.”). 
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the scope of software patents were more difficult to determine than other 
types of patents.69 Indeed, there is almost twice as high a reversal rate for 
claim construction decisions involving software patents compared to pa-
tents generally.70 As Bessen and Meurer argue, much of this may be be-
cause software is, itself, an abstract endeavor.71 Some of the high reversal 
rate may be explained by the indeterminacy of software claims, or because 
of “complex software claim construction rules.”72 The uncertain nature of 
claim construction is a serious problem.73 Miller concludes that, while 
“claim construction law appears to be working quite well for non-software 
patents .... [m]y results demonstrate that the same cannot be said of soft-
ware claim construction, which is highly unpredictable.”74 For pharmaceu-
tical patents, on the other hand, claims tend to be much more precise.75 
Chemical formulas are anything but abstract.76 That is not to say such 
claims are not broad, but that the outer boundaries are, on average, more 
determinate than for software claims. 
Another issue with software patents is the uncertainty over what is pa-
tent eligible. Many software patents are business method patents77—patents 
on the way of doing business—and have become common-place in the 
wake of Bilski v. Kappos.78 That decision—dealing with a patent on a 
method for hedging risk—did little, however, to provide firm footing to the 
nature of patentable subject matter.79 While the Court in Bilski held that no 
                                                                                                                         
69 See supra note 2. 
70 See Shawn P. Miller, Do “Fuzzy” Software Patent Boundaries Explain High Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates? 5 (Feb. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at htt 
p://ssrn.com/abstract=2139146 (finding a 40 percent reversal rate for software patent claims, 
and an 18 percent reversal rate across all other patent claims). 
71 See supra note 66. 
72 See Miller, supra note 70, at 27. 
73 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66, at 200 (“Nevertheless, in a broad range of 
cases, significant uncertainty remains as to whether abstract claims would be upheld, and, 
if so, how they would be interpreted if challenged in court.”). 
74 See Miller, supra note 70, at 24. 
75 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66, at 153 (describing the “clear boundaries 
provided by patents on chemical structures and compositions”). 
76 Id. 
77 See id. at 187 (claiming that “patents on business methods ... are largely 
software patents”). 
78 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); see Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1315, 1317–25 (2011) (“The patentability of software and business methods has a long and 
tortured history.”). 
79 See Lemley et al., supra note 78, at 1316 (“Put simply, the problem is that no one 
understands what makes an idea ‘abstract,’ and hence ineligible for patent protection ....”) 
(citation omitted); see also Mark Connolly, Note, The Search for America’s Most Eligible 
Patent: The Impact of the Bilski Decision on Obtaining Patents for Processes and Business 
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rule categorically barring business method patents was appropriate, it did 
not itself provide any rule to make clear what was subject-matter eligible.80 
The problem has been compounded lately with a number of different sub-
ject-matter cases, which have so far not provided clear guidance as to what 
is patentable subject matter. In Prometheus, the Supreme Court recently 
found that a patent lacked subject matter eligibility under the law-of-nature 
exception.81 In Myriad, the Court reversed-in-part the Federal Circuit, after 
having remanded the case in light of Prometheus, finding that naturally 
occurring genes could not be patented but so-called cDNA could be patent-
ed.82 The Federal Circuit, for its part, although not providing any clear guid-
ance, has dealt with a number of software-related subject-matter-eligibility 
cases, including Ultramercial, CLS Bank, and Bancorp.83 
Beyond uncertain subject matter requirements under § 101, lax definite-
ness requirements under § 112 further contribute to vague and unclear 
claims.84 While subject matter and definiteness concerns are not unique to 
software patents, they apply more to software patents than other patents. 
Business method patents, of which an appreciable subset are software 
patents,85 are particularly sensitive to subject matter concerns. Further, 
because many software claims are already abstract,86 any additional 
vagueness that lax definiteness requirements may impose only heightens 
the problem of determinacy. 
An additional wrinkle to the notice failure of software patents is that 
software patents are hard to search.87 This is, in part, because of poor in-
dexing and the ineffectiveness of keyword searching.88 When dealing with 
broad patent claims, it is difficult to effectively index everything such a 
                                                                                                                         
Methods, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 575, 578 (2012) (noting that the decision was 
“unhelpful in applying a prospective rule regarding business method patents”). 
80 See Lemley et al., supra note 78, at 1316; Connolly, supra note 79, at 578. 
81 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
82 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
83 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013); CLS Bank Int’l v. 
Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 
(Dec. 6, 2013); Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 
1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
84 See YEH, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
85 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66. 
86 See id. 
87 See Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 9–16 (2012). See generally Stephen Lindholm, Note, Marking 
the Software Patent Beast, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 82, 96–108 (2005) (discussing ways 
in which software patents are harder to search than other types of patents). 
88 See Lindholm, supra note 87, at 96. 
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claim might reach.89 Another issue is that software patents are classified 
by their specific industrial use rather than the algorithm that the claims 
rely on.90 That is, although a claim might describe a novel algorithm 
which is used in one field, that claim might also cover a use of the same 
algorithm for some unrelated field—but it may not be an obvious thing to 
search for, to an innovator in the other field. Keyword searches are of 
limited value because computer science is an emerging field and terms 
have not been fixed to the degree that they are in other arts; because terms 
such as “data” are broad and, in any event, do not narrow the search mean-
ingfully; and, because of the rapid pace of technological innovation, terms 
are sometimes changed, or no term yet exists to describe the innovation.91 
Ultimately, the difficulty of searching for patent claims and the indetermi-
nacy of many such claims compound the problems of notice failure for 
software patents. 
3. The Software Industry Relies Less on Patent Protection than Other 
Industries 
The software industry relies less on patent protection than other in-
dustries, especially the pharmaceutical or biotechnology industries.92 
Whereas the pharmaceutical industry clamors for more and stronger 
patent protection,93 the software industry does just the opposite.94 The 
reason that the AIA—the recent patent reform act—did not do much to 
address NPEs or notice failure is that while technology companies testified 
to Congress about the need for such reform,95 pharmaceutical companies 
testified to Congress about the need for stronger patent protection for their 
industry,96 resulting in stalemate.97 
                                                                                                                         
89 Id. at 98. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 104–06. 
92 See supra note 46. 
93 See, e.g., Long, supra note 44, at 45; Wiggins, supra note 17, at 283–84; 
Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 49. 
94 See, e.g., Long, supra note 44, at 44–45; Wiggins, supra note 17, at 285–86; supra 
notes 1, 37. 
95 E.g., America Invents Act: Hearing on H.R. 1249 Before the Subcomm. on 
Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Mark 
Chandler, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary, CISCO Systems, Inc.), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-35_65487.PDF. 
96 E.g., id. (statement of Steven W. Miller, Vice President and General Counsel for 
Intellectual Property, Proctor & Gamble Co.). 
97 See supra note 17; see also Zach Carter, The Spoilsmen: How Congress Corrupted 
Patent Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
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There are several reasons driving these industries into different camps 
regarding patent reform. Whereas in the pharmaceutical industry, drugs 
take over a decade to develop98 and are used for a long period of time,99 in 
the software industry, change happens incrementally and on a much faster 
scale.100 Additionally, it is much cheaper to copy a drug than to initially 
develop it.101 This makes patent protection critical in the pharmaceutical 
industry, but much less so for software. Moreover, in software, direct 
copying usually does not occur; rather, an infringer independently comes 
up with the same innovation.102 Indeed, so far from direct copying, the 
first notice an alleged infringer has of infringement is often the initiation 
of a lawsuit, especially with regard to NPEs. And while it is much cheaper 
to copy a drug than to develop it initially, the same is not true, at least to 
the same degree, for software patents. Because software patents do not 
disclose the computer code necessary to implement their claims, nor the 
many choices and tradeoffs involved in actual software development—
even copying a software patent may not be significantly cheaper than 
designing around that patent. 
Additionally, being first to market, having experience with the prod-
uct, and the power of a brand, all provide strong benefits to an innovator, 
especially in such a quickly changing field as software.103 Indeed, the 
software industry thrived for many years before software patents really 
came onto the scene. Bessen and Meurer note that “[e]conomists have 
long understood that the patent system works substantially better in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries than in most other industries.”104 
There are also cultural reasons why patents are not as critical in software. 
Early on much software innovation happened in the open, with developers 
                                                                                                                         
.com/2011/08/04/patent-reform-congress_n_906278.html (“The bill doesn’t fix the tech 
system, nor does it take steps to resolve the conflict between tech and pharma. It’s not 
obvious, for instance, why the same intellectual property rules for drugs have to apply 
to software.”). 
98 See Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 49. 
99 See id. at 12–14. 
100 See supra note 17. 
101 See, e.g., Posner, Competition and Creativity, supra note 3. 
102 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. 
REV. 1421, 1424 (2009) (“Copying seems to be the exception, not the rule in patent 
cases.”); Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (2007) (“In the information technology industries, it sometimes 
seems as though the overwhelming majority of patent suits are not brought against people 
who copied a technology, but against those who developed it independently.”). 
103 See, e.g., Posner, Competition and Creativity, supra note 3. 
104 BESSEN & MEUER, supra note 66, at 152. 
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freely sharing their work with each other.105 To some extent, this model 
still exists within the open-source development community. Companies 
such as RedHat, for instance, base their business model around the support 
that they provide, rather than on proprietary software.106 Even Google’s 
successful Android operating system is open-source and available to the 
public.107 Given the largely defensive role that patents play for technology 
companies,108 rather than seeking the protection provided by the patent 
system, it might better be said that these companies are seeking protection 
from the patent system. 
B. Damages and Incentives—Concerning the Public Purposes of the 
Patent System 
There is a strong incentive to avoid infringement in the patent law. 
Knowledge or notice of a patent is not a prerequisite to infringement, with a 
relatively small exception for marking.109 Willfulness of the infringer is 
only relevant for damages once infringement has been established.110 This 
makes patent infringement basically a strict-liability offense, which creates 
the incentive to proactively avoid infringing behavior. It does not, however, 
create an incentive for the patentee to actively enforce his rights. Except for 
a few weak exceptions,111 only market conditions act as incentives to active-
ly enforce patent rights. While this balancing might make sense in the ordi-
nary course, when dealing with NPEs, it creates an incentive to lie in wait 
                                                                                                                         
105 See generally Eric Steven Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar (2000), http:/ 
/www.catb.org/esr/writings/homesteading/cathedral-bazaar/ (describing early open source 
software development models). 
106 See Jon Brodkin, How Red Hat Killed Its Core Product—And Became a Billion-
Dollar Business, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 29, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/busine 
ss/2012/02/how-red-hat-killed-its-core-productand-became-a-billion-dollar-business/. 
107 ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://developer.android.com/about/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2014). 
108 See supra notes 31–32. 
109 See infra Part III. There is also a minor exception for indirect infringement under 
§ 271(b) or (c), but knowledge of infringement does not affect liability for direct infringement 
under § 271(a). Additionally, there is some notice requirement for § 271(g). See 35 U.S.C.A. 
§ 287(g) (2014); Process Patents Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 9001–
9007, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563–1567 (1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, 287 
(1988)). But these are minor exceptions and have limited relevance to this Note. 
110 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 284; In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions 
constituted infringement of a valid patent.”). 
111 Damages only extend back six years, 35 U.S.C. § 286, and the equitable doctrines 
of laches and estoppel provide some weak incentive to actively enforce patent rights. 
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for a product to become locked in and profitable. This is especially true for 
software patents, where notice failure is particularly high.112 Although 
such behavior may be in the interest of an NPE, it does not serve the pub-
lic purposes of the patent system. 
1. Incentive to Avoid Infringement 
In order to avoid infringing an unknown patent, an inventor can con-
duct a patent clearance search to determine if an existing patent covers his 
invention.113 In the pharmaceutical field, for instance, this strategy makes 
a good deal of sense. Drugs give rise to well-defined claims, the scope of 
which are fairly determinable.114 Moreover, the huge initial development 
costs outweigh the much smaller costs of conducting a patent clearance 
search.115 That is not the case for software patents. The problem of notice 
failure is particularly acute for software patents, making a patent clearance 
search hard, costly to conduct, and likely inadequate.116 Particularly 
troublesome is this likely inadequacy of a search; even where a patent is 
known beforehand, it will not be uncommon that a reasonable person 
having ordinary skill in the art would not find infringement ex ante, although 
a court sometimes will ex post.117 Moreover, the much smaller development 
costs118 make the costs of a patent clearance search, which may itself 
prove inadequate, harder to justify.119 This has led some scholars to conclude 
that, in many circumstances, patent clearance is “especially fruitless.”120 
                                                                                                                         
112 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
113 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66, at 48–51 (discussing patent 
clearance); Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 289–94 
(2011) (discussing patent clearance). 
114 See, e.g., supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text; see also Chien, supra note 113, at 
290 (“[Patent] clearance is viewed as ‘manageable’ in commercial-biopharmaceutical settings.”). 
115 See, e.g., supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra notes 67–91 and accompanying text. 
117 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66, at 50 (describing an infringement 
action between Kodak and Polaroid, in which despite a vigorous clearance search in 
which an expert had identified the patents-in-suit and concluded that they were either not 
infringed or invalid, ultimately infringement was found). 
118 See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
119 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66, at 50 (“The costs of sorting through a large 
number of uncertain property rights is larger than the expected costs incurred when any 
one patent is asserted against the innovator.”); id. at 200 (“[T]he uncertainty about 
boundaries makes clearance difficult and subjects inventors to the risk of inadvertent 
infringement.”); see also Mulligan & Lee, supra note 87 (“[Clearance] costs are 
relatively low in pharmaceuticals and other chemical industries. As a consequence, the 
patent system serves these industries relatively well. In contrast, discovery costs in the 
software industry are so high that most firms don’t even try to avoid infringement.”). 
120 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66, at 71; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE 
EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH 
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Although a clearance search is much more justifiable for pharmaceuti-
cal innovations than for software innovations, the incentive to avoid in-
fringement is the same. The patent law creates this incentive to avoid 
infringement by having damages, consisting of at least a “reasonable roy-
alty,” begin to accrue upon any infringing behavior, intent or knowledge 
notwithstanding—and those damages go back up to six years.121 Unlike in 
copyright law, where proof of copying is necessary,122 lack of knowledge 
of the patent provides no defense to infringement. Given the differences 
between the software and pharmaceutical industries; the problematic na-
ture of software patents, as opposed to pharmaceutical patents, particularly 
regarding notice failure; and the resulting differences between clearance 
searches in each industry, it makes little sense to treat these conflicting 
situations with the same incentives. 
It is worth examining why the patent law places such a strong incen-
tive to avoid infringement upon independent inventors. Patent law is 
unique in intellectual or real property because patentees have the power 
“to control the use of their idea—even by those who independently devel-
op a technology with no knowledge of the patent or the patentee.”123 Some 
have questioned whether this extraordinary right of exclusion is necessary 
to properly encourage innovation.124 Defenses of the right usually rest on 
the ability to fake independent inventorship, the weakening incentive to 
innovate that anything but strict liability would provide, or that while 
some industries might not be affected by this other industries which de-
pend upon patent law more critically would be harmed.125 Given that the 
                                                                                                                         
COMPETITION 135 (2011), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolvi 
ng-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/1 
10307patentreport.pdf (identifying the “difficulties in sifting through a multitude of 
patents,” particularly with regard to the information technology sector). 
121
The concept of willful infringement, see, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 
1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007), is an additional incentive to avoid infringement. That, 
however, is of limited importance here, where the focus is on notice failure. A 
prerequisite to finding willful infringement is knowledge of (or objective recklessness as 
to) both the patent and its infringement. Id. at 1371. 
122 Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
123 See Lemley, supra note 102, at 1525; see also Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 102, at 
1424 (“One of the most significant differences between patent law and other areas of intellectual 
property is that, in patent law, copying is irrelevant to the determination of infringement.”). 
124 See Lemley, supra note 102; Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a 
Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 475 (2006) (“This Article argues 
that independent invention should be a defense, provided the independent inventor 
creates the invention before receiving actual or constructive notice that someone else 
already created it.”). 
125 See Lemley, supra note 102, at 1527–32. 
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software industry relies less on patent protection than other industries;126 
that the cost of clearance is harder to justify for software patents; and that 
NPEs usually do not invent anything, but most often acquire patent rights 
from others, it makes sense to view this strict liability aspect of the patent 
law more skeptically for software patents asserted by NPEs. Rather than 
proposing an independent inventor defense, however, this Note instead 
argues that damages should not begin to accumulate until the alleged in-
fringer receives some notice of infringement. 
2. Incentive for NPEs to Lie in Wait 
There is an incentive for NPEs to lie in wait for a product to become 
locked in before bringing an infringement suit.127 As a rule, NPEs tend to 
assert old patents.128 This is because, in the current system, liability does 
not depend on knowledge of infringement.129 And, unlike in trademark 
law, there are only weak incentives to proactively enforce patent rights.130 
To be sure, there is a six-year limit on damages,131 and the equitable doc-
trines of laches and estoppel exist,132 but these alone do not counterbal-
ance the incentive to wait for a product to become locked in. The longer a 
product or a component of a system is in use, the more it can be relied 
                                                                                                                         
126 See supra Part I.A.3. 
127 See Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of 
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 140 (2010) (describing how an NPE 
may wait “until a manufacturer [has sunk] investments into developing and marketing a 
successful product that infringed its patent and then threaten[] the manufacturer with an 
injunction to obtain high licensing fees.”). 
128 See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy 
Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 165–66 
(2006) (“Another characteristic of patent trolls is their acquisition and enforcement of 
older patents on newer products.”); David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent 
Usage with an Open Post-Grant Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009, 4 (2005) 
(“[C]orporate patent trolls purchase patents and do not enforce them until the relevant 
industry has grown up around the patent.” (emphasis added)). 
129 See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
130 Compare Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 
1959) (stating that federal trademark law “places an affirmative duty upon a licensor of a 
registered trademark to take reasonable measures to detect and prevent misleading uses of 
his mark by his licensees or suffer cancellation of his federal registration”), with infra 
notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
131 See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2006). 
132 See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (describing the elements of laches and equitable estoppel in patent cases). 
Note that the six-year statutory limit on damages is distinct from the six-year period that 
creates a presumption of laches. Id. 
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upon, and therefore, the harder it is to subsequently change. If a patentee 
knows of infringement early on, bringing an infringement action or begin-
ning licensing negotiations may cause an infringer to seek a design-
around. But if the patentee waits until the product has become locked in 
and profitable, he gets the two-fold benefit of being able to seek increased 
damages over a longer period of time, and having the product or compo-
nent of a system being more expensive to replace. That gives the patentee 
increased leverage during settlement or licensing negotiations. Thus, 
although the six-year limit on damages does encourage some proactive 
enforcement of patent rights, there is a much stronger incentive to lie in 
wait, especially since the years that such a rule exclude are likely to pro-
duce less in damages than when a product has become more mature. 
There are incentives to sleep on patent rights, but no strong legal in-
centives to proactively enforce patent rights. However, there can be strong 
market incentives to do so. This is true when a patent holder is in direct 
competition with an infringer. A stark illustration of this principle is the so-
called “smartphone wars”—where Apple has pursued a number of Google 
affiliates in an effort to protect its smartphone market share—which are 
being waged largely on the patent battlefield.133 Even when there is not 
direct competition, it may sometimes be in a patentee’s interest to discour-
age infringement as a means of making a product distinctive. But for NPEs, 
who do not produce anything and so are not in direct competition and have 
no brand to protect, these economic incentives to proactively enforce pa-
tent rights do not exist. 
3. The Public Benefits from Prompt Patent Enforcement 
The public benefits from having patent rights actively enforced. Most 
clearly, active enforcement can encourage a potential infringer to design 
around a patent and thereby provide new innovation to the public.134 But 
active enforcement can also serve to make the scope of the patent clearer, as 
                                                                                                                         
133 Matt Levy, Smartphone Patent Wars: A Lesson for Privateers, PAT. PROGRESS 
(June 27, 2013), http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/06/27/smartphone-patent-wars-a-les 
son-for-privateers/; Agustino Fontevecchia, Smartphone Wars: Who Wins and Who Loses 
from the Apple–Samsung Patent Ruling, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://www.f 
orbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/08/27/smartphone-wars-who-wins-and-who-loses-fro 
m-the-apple-samsung-patent-ruling/. 
134 See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the patent system 
works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its 
constitutional purpose.”); Lindholm, supra note 87, at 88 (“Patents indirectly encourage 
inventors to find multiple solutions to problems.”). 
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decisions come down clarifying the scope of a patent or finding a patent 
invalid. This is beneficial to the public because it helps to correct the prob-
lems of notice failure. It will tend to make licensing or settlement negotia-
tions more certain and lower transaction costs as a result. And, to the extent 
that patent scope is made clearer, such enforcement can work to aid in dis-
closure of the patent claims, which is one of the fundamental purposes in-
volved in the quid pro quo of the patent system.135 The economic incentives 
of the patent system generally depend upon patent claims being publicly 
available.136 Those incentives—invention, designing around, disclosure, 
and commercialization—are therefore strengthened, to the extent that 
prompt patent enforcement makes otherwise obscure or uncertain patent 
claims public. 
The purpose of the patent system is not to create private fortunes. The 
system grants certain monopoly rights in exchange for public disclosure of 
the invention. But the purpose of it is to bring the benefits of innovation 
and commercialization to the public. That an NPE might stand to gain 
more by lying in wait is of no consequence, especially where such behav-
ior is contradictory to the public purposes of the patent system. Indeed, 
where the incentives are so out of order, it creates a strong argument that 
change is needed to right the system. 
C. Requiring Notice of Infringement Before Damages Begin to Accrue 
To correct the incentives of the patent system, notice ought to be given 
to an alleged infringer before damages begin to accrue, at least for soft-
ware patent claims asserted by NPEs.137 This will create an incentive for 
NPEs to proactively enforce their patent rights and will serve to counter-
balance the negative effects previously described. Moreover, because of 
the problems of notice failure, particularly regarding software patents, it 
makes sense to put some burden on the patentee to police his rights. In-
deed, it is the patentee who is often in a better position to detect infringing 
                                                                                                                         
135 See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) 
(“As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a 
seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade 
secret.”); Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1028 (1989) (“The incentive to disclose 
argument ... rests on the premise that in the absence of patent protection inventors would 
keep their inventions secret in order to prevent competitors from exploiting them. 
Secrecy prevents the public from gaining the full benefit of new knowledge and leads to 
wasteful duplicative research.”). 
136 See Lindholm, supra note 87, at 110. 
137 See infra Part IV (explaining what such a notice requirement might look like). 
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behavior than parties, who are not familiar with the patent or are uncertain 
of its scope. 
1. The Case for Requiring Notice 
Notice failure in patent law is a serious problem, as this Note has 
demonstrated. It creates uncertainty and risk for companies trying to create 
new products. It weakens the economic incentives of the patent system, 
calling into question the wisdom of giving patent holders exclusionary 
rights in their patented claims. Requiring notice of infringement before 
damages begin to accrue corrects some, but not all, of these problems. 
Notice after the fact, for instance, cannot correct the uncertainty of patent 
scope, or mitigate all the risk that companies face due to that uncertainty, 
prior to developing a new product. Although it has the effect of limiting 
damages, companies may still face the threat of an injunction. The possi-
bility of an injunction might be an incentive for a patent holder to lie in 
wait, instead of actively enforcing his patent rights. However, following 
eBay v. MercExchange, the likelihood of an NPE obtaining an injunction 
is considerably reduced.138 
Although requiring notice before allowing damages to begin to accrue 
may not fix all the problems of notice failure, it can significantly ameliorate 
them. Principally, requiring notice will encourage NPEs to bring suit earlier 
than they otherwise would. This is because most of the advantages of 
waiting for product lock-in are gone—damages will only be forward look-
ing, which will also decrease the overall cost of seeking a design around or 
license, and the threat of an injunction is small. This will also encourage 
NPEs to be more careful about the suits they bring because NPEs will face 
smaller overall damage awards or settlements as a result of litigation, caus-
ing litigation costs to consume more of their operating expenses. Prompt 
enforcement of patent rights, which a notice requirement would encour-
age, also benefits the public purposes of the patent system. 
2. The Case for Targeting Software Patents 
Having a notice requirement before damages begin to accrue is meant 
to correct the problems of notice failure in the patent law. This notice 
failure is most critical for software patents.139 Clearance searches for such 
patents are often “especially fruitless”—expensive, uncertain, and unlikely 
                                                                                                                         
138 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
139 See supra notes 67–91 and accompanying text. 
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to ward off any risk of future litigation.140 Moreover, the technological 
industry relies less on patent protection than other industries, particularly 
the pharmaceutical industry.141 Given that problems with notice are 
heightened for software patents, and that the patent system provides less 
support to the technological industry, it makes sense to specifically target 
software patents. After all, as already described, software patents are dif-
ferent from other types of patents.142 
3. The Case for Targeting NPEs 
As this Note has explained, there is a particular worry about NPEs 
sleeping on their rights, lying in wait for a product to become locked in 
before bringing an infringement action.143 The notice requirement this 
Note proposes, therefore, specifically targets NPEs. As explained, the 
market incentives that exist for companies that produce a product to en-
force their rights do not influence NPEs. Additionally, NPEs are generally 
free from any marking requirements that other companies face.144 This 
only compounds the problems of notice failure. NPEs are also known to 
read their claims more broadly than other patentees.145 This results in 
significantly lower findings of infringement and also increases the tenden-
cy for notice failure. There is, therefore, a good reason for targeting NPEs 
over other types of entities. 
II. RATIONALE OF PATENT MARKING AND WHY ITS PUBLIC-NOTICE FEATURE 
SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO COVER NPES ASSERTING SOFTWARE PATENTS 
The marking statute requires that patentees, who market and sell their 
patented products, mark their products in a manner that makes the patent 
rights conspicuous to the public.146 Where marking is feasible and is not 
done, damages do not begin to accrue until the patentee provides actual 
notice of infringement.147 Indeed, the public notice function of the mark-
ing statue is deemed so important that the patentee must provide actual 
notice even where the infringer is already aware of the patent and its 
                                                                                                                         
140 See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 92–108 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra Part I.A. 
143 See supra notes 127–33 and accompanying text. 
144 See infra Part II. 
145 Cf. Risch, supra note 22, at 484 (noting that NPEs assert overly broad claim 
constructions resulting in a low rate of actual infringement being found). 
146 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 287(a) (West 2014). 
147 Id. 
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infringement.148 Moreover, where the patentee marks a product with an 
inapplicable patent or invalidated patent, he may be subject to penalties for 
false marking.149 
A. Why Marking? 
Marking serves an important notice feature of patent law by helping to 
avoid innocent infringement, encouraging public notice, and identifying 
products as patented.150 The marking requirement protects an innocent 
infringer who might see an unmarked product for sale and assume its de-
sign is public.151 Thus, although patents are themselves publicly available, 
patent law requires that products be marked rather than rely on a purported 
notice from publicly available patent applications. This requirement to 
mark is important, both because the bounds of a patent are uncertain and 
because performing a clearance search can be costly and inadequate, especial-
ly for software patents. By requiring actual notice before damages begin to 
accrue, the marking statute highlights the importance of the disclosure 
incentive of the patent system. 
B. Marking and Software Patents 
The applicability of the marking requirement to software patents is not 
entirely clear, but it is clear that it does not apply in many common situa-
tions. In order for the marking statute to apply, there must be a tangible 
article.152 Additionally, the marking statute does not apply to pure method 
                                                                                                                         
148 See Jessica S. Siegel, Note, The Patent Marking & Notice Statute: Invitation to 
Infringe or Protection for the Unwary?, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 583, 602–03 (1999) (stating 
that an infringer’s independent knowledge of the patent does not affect the patentee’s 
duty to notify where marking is not done). 
149 35 U.S.C.A. § 292. The AIA restricted standing on this to persons who have 
“suffered a competitive injury,” but false marking remains an important aspect of the 
public-notice requirement of marking. Id. § 292(b). 
150 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating 
that the Marking Statute serves three purposes, namely: (1) “helping to avoid innocent 
infringement”; (2) “encouraging patentees to give notice to the public that the article is 
patented”; and (3) “aiding the public to identify whether an article is patented” 
(citations omitted)). 
151 See John LaBarre & Xavier Gómez-Velasco, Ready, Set, Mark Your Patented 
Software!, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 27 (2005) (“It is protection against innocent 
infringement which is exactly what the Marking Requirement is supposed to cure.”); 
Siegel, supra note 148, at 585–87 (“[A] fundamental rationale supporting section 287 [is] 
supplying notice in order to prevent innocent infringement.” (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. 
United States, 729 F.2d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1984))). 
152 See LaBarre & Gómez-Velasco, supra note 151, at 13. 
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patents,153 or mixed method-apparatus patents where only methods are 
asserted.154 These two thresholds to applying the marking statute raise an 
interesting question of what to make of software patents.155 Because soft-
ware patents are sometimes pure method patents, because sometimes they 
are mixed method-apparatus patents where only method claims are assert-
ed, and because there is not always an obvious tangible component to 
mark,156 the applicability of the marking requirement to software is murky. 
Additionally, change happens at a fast pace in software: consider a patented 
algorithm in an update to a device driver for a particular brand of a wireless 
keyboard, automatically downloaded from the internet. The lack of the 
applicability of the marking statute, or, where it may arguably be applicable, 
its uncertain status, further contributes to notice failure for software patent 
claims. Of course, where there is no product to mark, as is the case for soft-
ware patents asserted by NPEs, there is no marking requirement. 
C. Extending the Public-Notice Feature of Patent Marking 
The Federal Circuit identified three primary purposes of the marking 
statute: (1) avoiding innocent infringement; (2) encouraging public notice; 
and (3) aiding the public in identifying a patented article.157 Given the al-
ready observed problem of notice failure regarding software patents in par-
ticular, and especially with respect to NPEs, which have limited incentives 
to proactively enforce their rights as well as no product to mark, it makes at 
least as good sense to extend the public notice feature of patent marking to 
software patents asserted by NPEs. Doing so will help to avoid innocent 
infringement, since once an infringer is made aware of his activity, he will 
have the opportunity to switch to non-infringing activity, license with the 
patentee, or contest either that his activity infringes or the validity of the 
patent. Doing so will also help to encourage public notice; the alleged in-
fringer must be given notice before damages can accrue, but other compa-
nies or individual inventors engaging in similar activity would also benefit 
from the required notice. Moreover, because of the acute problems of notice 
                                                                                                                         
153 Id. 
154 See Eugene Goryunov & Mark Polyakov, To Mark or Not to Mark: Application of the 
Patent Marking Statute to Websites and the Internet, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 11 (2007). 
155 See generally Goryunov & Polyakov, supra note 154; LaBarre & Gómez-Velasco, 
supra note 151; Lindholm, supra note 87. 
156 Consider, for instance, a patented algorithm used to balance server load being used 
in e-commerce transactions, with all the software loaded on third-party computer 
systems, and as a component of a much larger system. Or a patented communication 
protocol, constantly being sent around the world through an interconnected network of 
third-party computers. 
157 See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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failure, the rationale of protecting the “innocent infringer” applies with at 
least as strong a force here as it does in the marking statute. 
III. WHAT A NOTICE REQUIREMENT WOULD LOOK LIKE 
The requirement that damages do not begin to accrue until actual notice 
is provided for software patents asserted by NPEs is relatively straightfor-
ward to implement. The key issues to settle are what constitutes a software 
patent, what constitutes an NPE, and what constitutes actual notice. Although 
there is by no means unanimous agreement on what any of these terms ought 
to mean, there has been much discussion of them in the literature, and, on 
the last term, actual notice, there is some guidance from the courts. All this 
is not to say that choosing particular definitions might not be contentious, 
but certainly some judicially enforceable choices exist. 
A. Limit to Software Patents 
The requirement that notice of infringement be given before damages 
begin to accrue should be limited to software patents. As demonstrated 
above, software patents are distinct from other types of patents, and in 
particular, the pharmaceutical industry and the software industry have very 
different sets of needs.158 The notion of treating different things differently 
is hardly novel and has also been proposed in other areas of intellectual 
property, such as in copyright law.159 David Drummond, Google’s Chief 
Legal Officer, has said, “I think what we need to do to is move past the 
one-size-fits-all and start thinking about software patents more specifical-
ly.”160 The idea of software-specific rules has also found some support in 
the academy.161 
Practically, there may be some dispute about what constitutes a software 
patent,162 but for most purposes it should be a straightforward matter to 
decide. There is, at the very least, a sharp divide between software patents 
                                                                                                                         
158 See supra Part II.A. 
159 See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT (2011). 
160 Evan Ramstad, Google Chief: Patent Legal Reform a Balancing Act, WALL ST. J. 
DIGITS BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 6:21 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/10/09/google-leg 
al-chief-patent-reform-a-balancing-act. 
161 See, e.g., Ashley Chuang, Fixing the Failures of Software Patent Protection: 
Deterring Patent Trolling by Applying Industry-Specific Patentability Standards, 16 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 215, 245–50 (2006) (arguing for software-specific standards); Long, 
supra note 44, at 47–48. 
162 See, e.g., James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 
8–9 (Research on Innovation, Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004), http://www.research 
oninnovation.org/swpat.pdf; Bronwyn H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value 
of Software Patents 13–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12195, 
2006), http://www.nber.org/papers/w12195.pdf. 
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on the one hand, and pharmaceutical patents on the other, such that a rule 
tailored to software patents is not likely to seriously affect pharmaceutical 
patents. Moreover, judges are expected to decide complex issues of claim 
construction, to consider nuanced arguments over the doctrine of equiva-
lents, and to make fine distinctions over what constitutes patentable sub-
ject matter. That there may be some fuzziness on the edges of what consti-
tutes a software patent hardly makes it a problem that judges cannot be 
expected to solve. 
Congressmen Defazio and Chaffetz defined the term in recent legisla-
tion that they have proposed: 
The term ‘software patent’ means a patent that covers— 
‘(A) any process that could be implemented in a computer regardless of 
whether a computer is specifically mentioned in the patent; or 
‘(B) any computer system that is programmed to perform a process de-
scribed in subparagraph (A).’163 
This definition seems reasonable enough, and would not be too judicially 
taxing to enforce. 
B. Defining Notice—Carryover from the Marking Statute 
The notice requirement can be borrowed from the jurisprudence on the 
marking statute, which requires “actual notice.”164 Courts have required 
the allegation of infringement of specific patents by specific products.165 It 
is not enough to aver to a large patent portfolio, or to make vague sugges-
tions of infringement. Because the purpose behind this notice requirement 
and the marking statute are similar, and because the proposed notice re-
quirement is in some sense an extension of the marking statute, it is logical 
to adopt a similar concept of actual notice. 
However, the two situations do differ in at least one important respect. It 
is not as necessary here to keep a requirement of actual notice where the 
infringer knows of the patent and knows his activity infringes that patent. 
The marking statute does require actual notice even where the accused in-
fringer already has knowledge of the patent and the likelihood of infringe-
ment, and it does so, in part, because marking provides notice to the general 
public and should be encouraged.166 Here, however, the notice is meant 
primarily for the accused infringer, so it does not make as much sense to 
require actual notice where the accused infringer already has knowledge of 
the patent and the likelihood of infringement. Such a rule would, to be sure, 
                                                                                                                         
163 H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2012). 
164 See supra Part III. 
165 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
166 See supra Part II. 
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save judicial time, as it is a clear rule to apply. There would be no need for a 
contentious proceeding where the patentee goes to every effort to show the 
accused infringer’s knowledge of infringing behavior. But this judicial 
economy must be weighed against the potential safe harbor such a rule 
would give to willful infringers, as opposed to the “innocent infringers” the 
rule is designed to protect. Weighing these concerns, it does not appear that 
a rule requiring actual notice by the patentee, even where the infringer is 
aware both of the patent’s existence and of his infringement of the patent, 
best serves the public purposes of the patent system. 
C. Defining Non-Practicing Entities 
While patent trolls, or NPEs, are widely discussed in the literature, 
there are a number of different ways of defining the term. There are even a 
number of different terms being used, such as Patent Assertion Entities or 
Patent Monetization Companies. Some observers would include universi-
ties, others not. Some would include small, independent inventors, others 
not. Some would include formerly productive companies that have turned 
to litigation only after collapse, others not. In short, there are a number of 
choices in who exactly would be subject to the requirement.167 Ultimately, 
fine distinctions about who is or is not an NPE will not be terribly signifi-
cant. Universities account for a vanishingly small percentage of patentees 
bringing infringement actions; the bulk of infringement actions brought by 
entities that might conceivably fit under the term NPE are brought by 
patent holding companies or other corporations formed for the express 
purpose of patent litigation, that is, the quintessential patent troll.168 
Congressmen Defazio and Chaffetz defined, in recent legislation they 
proposed to Congress, a non-practicing entity in terms of any entity that 
does not fit under one of these conditions: 
(1) ORIGINAL INVENTOR.—Such party is the inventor, a joint inven-
tor, or in the case of a patent filed by and awarded to an assignee of the 
original inventor or joint inventor, the original assignee of the patent. 
(2) EXPLOITATION OF THE PATENT.—Such party can provide docu-
mentation to the court of substantial investment made by such party in the 
exploitation of the patent through production or sale of an item covered by 
the patent. 
(3) UNIVERSITY OR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ORGANIZATION.—
Such party is— 
 (A) an institution of higher education (as that term is defined in 
section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001); or 
                                                                                                                         
167 See Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization 
Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 366–72 (2012) (describing 
terms used to identify NPEs and problems with whom to include in that category). 
168 See id. at 376. 
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 (B) a technology transfer organization whose primary purpose is 
to facilitate the commercialization of technology developed by one or 
more institutions of higher education.169 
This definition seems reasonable. While there may be corner cases or 
objections as to particular entities, the worst of the non-practicing entities 
or patent assertion entities or patent trolls—call them what you will—can 
be defined without including individual inventors or universities. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a general consensus that the current patent system is not opti-
mal. For some, it can be crippling. It hinders innovation, creates risks and 
uncertainties, and encourages counterproductive behavior. Much of this 
can be traced to the problems of notice failure, which is particularly acute 
for software patents asserted by NPEs. Where patent rights are uncertain 
and their scope impossible to determine ex ante, there will necessarily be 
some entities seeking to profit from this state of affairs. Knowing the high 
stakes involved and the expense of even successfully defending an in-
fringement action, even innocent parties are tempted to settle. Only the 
biggest of companies, willing to take a hard stand to make a point, can 
afford to defend themselves against repeated infringement claims. The 
situation demands reform. 
The reform advocated by this Note, that damages do not accrue until 
actual notice is provided to an infringer when a software patent is asserted 
by an NPE, helps soften some of the more egregious effects of the current 
system. In particular, while helping technology companies against the 
overbearing threat of patent trolls, the proposal will keep in place the 
strong patent protections that other industries, in particular the pharmaceu-
tical and biotechnology industries, depend upon. The tonic is a targeted 
one, designed to help the system where it is most damaged, but leave in 
place what is functioning properly. As such, despite the traditional an-
tagonism between technology companies on the one hand, and pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology companies on the other, those industries need 
not work against each other with respect to the reform this Note proposes. 
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